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ABSTRACT 
------~~~--------~~~--~~--~--~----~~~~~--------~ Durable goods leave residuals after being retired from use. If 
the environmental costs of the residuals are external to consumers 
and producers of the good, then overproduction and excess residuals 
will result. Ad valorem taxes are show to be ineffective in 
eliminating this externality. The efficient regulatory policy is 
shown to be based on a pigouvian tax. 
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1.- INTRODUCTION. 
Most durable goods leave a residual after being retired 
from use. Dead batteries and used paper plates, for instance, 
are residuals. The amount of residuals generated depends on 
the average life of the good, i.e., on its durability. In 
turn, the average life of a good is, in many cases, a 
decision variable controlled to some extent by the producer 
of the good. Car makers, within some limits, choose the 
(expected) duration of the cars they make. Likewise, both 
glass and plastic cups, render similar services while having 
different durations. Thus, when a firm chooses the average 
life of its products, it is also indirectly choosing the 
amount and composition of the residuals that will be 
generated. 
There are two broad categories of costs related to the 
production and consumption of goods that leave residuals. 
First, there are production costs. In general, increasing the 
average duration of a good is costly. Thus, production costs 
are positively related to the average life of the good1 • 
Second, there are costs originated by the existence of 
residuals. Residuals have to be recycled, or disposed one way 
or another. Furthermore, after it has been disposed, a 
residual may also generate pollution. We refer to the total 
costs of recycling, disposal and pollution as environmental 
1 This is true for the unit cost of production of the good. 
The cost per unit of service provided, however, may not be 
related to duration in a monotonous fashion. 
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costs. Environmental costs are inversely related to the 
average life of the good. For a given level of total 
consumption , longer-lived goods will generate less residuals. 
While production costs are incurred by the firm, it is 
less than clear who pays for the environmental costs. 
Typically, the producer of a durable good assumes no 
responsibility for the elimination of the residuals of its 
products. Consumers, in turn, may bear some -typically 
small- disposal costs. Recycling and pollution costs, 
however, are not usually paid by the consumers. Throughout 
this paper it will be a maintained assumption that the costs 
related to the existence of residuals are not incurred by 
neither the producers nor the consumers of the good. This 
generates an externality. Since producers and consumers 
ignore the costs originated by the residuals, a tendency 
towards the production of inefficiently short-lived goods can 
be expected. In other words, there will be too many 
residuals2 • 
The purpose of this paper is to characterize tax pOlicies 
that provide an incentive for firms and consumers to produce 
and buy goods of efficient duration. The framework of 
analysis is the standard theory of externalities and optimal 
2 A similar effect is caused by Planned Obsolescence, 
Bulow (1986). There is Planned Obsolescence when a firm chooses 
to produce goods of a duration below the minimum cost duration 
in order to increase sales. In our analysis, however, strategic 
behavior is not considered. 
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pollution control; see Pearce and Turner (1990), Baumol and 
Oates (1988), Mishan (1982), and Pigou (1920). Our model 
extends this analysis to a dynamic environment in which firms 
choose the duration of their products. 
since the average life of a good is not observable ex 
ante, we will only consider tax policies which do not depend 
on the actual durability of the good taxed. Our main point is 
simplY this: for a tax policy to be effective in reducing 
residuals it must penalize repeated purchasing of the good. 
Thus, an efficient tax must be linked to the purchase of the 
good. The price or the value of the good, which are commonly 
used as a basis for taxation, are not useful in penalizing 
repeated purchasing. In summary, a pigouvian tax is also 
optimal in this dynamic context. 
There are two direct consequences of this result. First, 
an "ad valorem" tax must be relatively ineffective in 
reducing residuals because it is linked to the total 
expenditure in the good (but not to the number of units 
bought). Second, an "specific" tax, one that is charged per 
unit bought, must be relatively more effective in reducing 
residuals because it penalizes repeated purchasing of the 
good. 
This line of reasoning is formalized in a simple model of 
°a durable good market; all consumers are assumed to value the 
good by the services it provides, regardless of its age or 
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duration. We consider two alternative market structures, 
monopoly and perfect competition. The same results obtain in 
both cases. 
It is shown that, in the absence of a tax policy, the 
equilibrium duration of the good is too short and, in 
consequence, too many residuals are generated. Next, we 
consider the effect on equilibrium duration of two different 
tax systems. "Ad valorem" taxes are shown to be neutral in 
the sense that no incentive is provided to change the 
equilibrium duration of the goods produced. Thus, an "ad 
valorem" tax cannot be used as a cure for inefficiently 
short-lived goods. It is also found that "specific" taxes, 
paid per unit bought, are potentially non-neutral, and 
therefore can be used to induce production of longer-lived 
goods. A characterization of the optimal specific tax is 
provided: the amount charged per unit of product must be 
equal to its environmental cost, i.e., a pigouvian tax is 
optimal. 
To summarize, the logic behind these results is simply 
this. The durability of a good is directly related to the 
number of times it is bought (and thus replaced). An specific 
tax exploits this link by penalizing repeated purchases. This 
creates an incentive to produce and buy longer-lived 
products. On the other hand, the total expenditure in the 
good, in equilibrium, does not depend on its durability; 
since an ad valorem tax is charged on the total expenditure 
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in the good, it must be neutral with respect to the duration 
of the good. 
The neutrality of the ad valorem tax suggests that it can 
be used, without distorting the choice of duration, to 
correct other market imperfections. An example of the optimal 
regulatory policy for a monopoly will be developed below. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we 
provide an example of a two period model in which the 
external effect of residuals and the basics of the model can 
be more easily understood. Next, section 3, efficiency in the 
general model is characterized. section 4 discusses 
consumers' behavior; and section 5 gives the characterization 
of optimal regulatory policies. Finally, section 6 contains 
some concluding remarks. 
2 • - AN EXAMPLE. 
It is convenient to consider first an example with a 
simplified intertemporal structure. Let's consider a good 
that can be manufactured to last either 1 or 2 periods. 
Production costs are C(l) and C(2), respectively. As long as 
the good remains operative, the services it provides are 
identical, regardless of age or duration. Thus, there are two 
alternatives to obtain the services of the good. It is 
possible to produce the short-lived good for two consecutive 
periods at a discounted production cost of: 
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TC( 1) =C (1) (2+r) / (1+r) 
where r is the discount rate. It is also possible to produce 
the long-lived good at a cost of C(2). 
The environmental cost of the good, which is independent 
of its duration, is E. Thus, the total (social) costs 
incurred to obtain the services of the good for two periods 
can be: 
or 
CC(1)= (C(1)+E) (2+r)/(1+r) 
CC(2)= C(2)+E 
An efficient duration must minimize the total cost of 
obtaining the services of the good. Thus, it is efficient to 
produce the long-lived good if 
(*) (C(1)+E)/(1+r»= C(2)-C(1) 
i.e., if the total cost of producing one unit of the short-
lived good in the second period is larger than the 
incremental cost of increasing the life of the good from one 
to two periods. 
Let P(1) and P(2) be the prices of the short-lived and 
long-lived good, respectively. The total expenditures 
required to obtain the services of the good for two periods 
are: 
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and 
X(l)=P(l) (2+r)/(1+r) 
X (2) =P (2) . 
Consumers are indexed by m>O, where m is the reservation 
value of consumer m. Thus, consumer m will demand the short-
lived good if m<=X(1)<=X(2), the long-lived good if 
m<=X(2)<=X(1), and will choose not to buy otherwise. We will 
suppose in this example that consumers' reservation values 
are distributed uniformly on the interval [O,A]. 
Suppose (*) does not hold. Then, an efficient allocation 
requires to produce the good of duration 1; it must be 
offered at a price equal to its cost, i.e., P(l)=C(l)+E, and 
a total of (A-CC(l)) units must be produced each period. 
otherwise, the long-lived good must be produced; its price 
must satisfy P(2)=C(2)+E, and a total of (A-CC(2)) units must 
be produced. 
Firms will choose a duration to minimize their total 
private costs. This choice is independent of the number of 
firms offering the product. Minimization of production costs 
will lead to choose the short duration if: 
(**) C ( 1) (2 +r) / ( 1 +r) <= C (2 ) 
and the long duration otherwise. Thus, if firms ignore 
environmental costs, inefficiently short-lived goods may be 
produced. From (*) and (**) it follows that, if 
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O<=(l+r) (C(2)-C(1»-C(1)<E, it is efficient to manufacture 
the good to last for two periods but firms will choose a 
duration of only one period. 
Under perfect competition, the price of each duration will 
be set equal to the private cost of production, P(l)=C(l) and 
P(2)=C(2). This price is below the true marginal cost. In 
each case, a total of (A-C(l) (2+r)/(1+r» and (A-C(2» units 
will be produced, respectively. Thus, too many units will be 
produced. 
A monopolist, on the other hand, would choose a price 
P(l)= [A(1+r)/(2+r)+C(1)]/2 
if (**) holds, and would set 
P(2)= (A+C(2»/2 
otherwise. At these prices, actual production may be above or 
below the efficient levels, but is always above the 
equilibrium levels that would obtain should the monopolist 
take into account the true (marginal) cost. 
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3.- EFFICIENCY. 
Consider the market for a durable good D. Let d [0,) 
denote the number of years that the good will be in service. 
While in service, every good generates the same services, 
regardless of its durability d or age. 
Let C(d) be the cost of producing one unit of D that will 
last d years. C ( is twice continuously differentiable, 
Cl ( »0 and Cl I ( »0. Thus increasing the average duration 
of the good is costly and the cost increases at an increasing 
rate. Furthermore, it seems natural to assume that C(oo)=oo 
and C(O)=O. 
In order to characterize an efficient duration, we must 
consider total costs per unit of service provided (instead of 
the cost per unit of product). We must consider, for 
instance, the cost per mile of a car, and not the cost of the 
car itself. Thus, we define the cost of maintaining one unit 
of duration d in service forever is: 
(1) 
where r is the discount rate. TC(d) is the discounted 
production cost of replacing the good every d years. 
Let E>O be the environmental cost of one unit of D, i.e., 
E is the cost of recycling or disposing of one unit of D. E 
is assumed to be independent of the duration d of the good. 
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The total environmental cost of maintaining one unit of 
duration d in service forever is: 
(2) TE (d) = E2: _ e-rdt= (l_e-rd ) -lE t-l, .. ,CXl 
which is a decreasing function of the duration d. 
Total costs are thus: 
(3 ) CC(d)= TC(d)+ TE(d) 
Since, by assumption, the age and duration of the good do not 
change the quality of the services it provides, an efficient 
duration d* is simply one that minimizes total costs. 
d* can be characterized as follows: 
PROPOSITION 1: d* is the unique solution of 
(4) C' (d*)=re-rd*CC(d*). 
PROOF: Equation (4) is the first order necessary condition 
obtained from the definition of CC( ). The function CC( ) is 
not necessarily convex. However, it can be show that it 
reaches a unique minimum as follows: to characterize d*, 
notice that 
Hence, CC( must reach a 
minimum for some d* strictly positive and finite. Therefore, 
a necessary condition for d to be efficient is that 
CC' (d*)=O, that is, c' (d*)=re-rd*CC(d*). Furthermore, if d* 
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solves (1) then CC" (d*»O so that any solution of (1) is at 
least a local minimum and there are no local maxima. 
Continuity of CC( ) then requires the local minimum to be 
unique. 1111. 
Notice that the efficient duration can be defined without 
regard to demand factors. This is so because, in our model, 
consumers are concerned with the services provided by the 
good, not with the good itself. This is a simplifying 
assumption. There are durable goods, however, which do not 
conform to the assumption. New cars may be preferred to old 
cars (even after controlling for the difference in their 
expected operative lives). This possibility is simply assumed 
away along this paper. 
Let I S examine now the choice of duration of a cost-
minimizing firm that ignores the social costs of the 
residuals. 
PROPOSITION 2: In the absence of a tax policy inefficiently 
short-lived goods will be produced. 
PROOF: The firm will select a duration d' to minimize TC(d) . 
The first order condition for this problem can be written as: 
Cl (d')=re-rd ' (CC(d')-(l-e-rd ')-lE) 
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which implies that C'(d')-re-rd'CC(d')<O (Le., CC(d) is 
decreasing at d'). It was show in proposition 1 that CC(d) is 
decreasing if, and only if, d<d*. Hence d'<d*.///. 
This result confirms our intuition that, if environmental 
costs are ignored, then there will be too many residuals. The 
resul t ho lds, with independence of the particular market 
structure considered, as long as each minimizes its private 
cost. 
4.- CONSUMERS' BEHAVIOR. 
Next, we model the demand side of the market. Let p(d) be 
the price of a good of duration d. The total expenditure 
required to maintain one unit of d in stock forever is: 
(5) X(d)=p(d)E _ e-rdt=(1_e-rd)-lp(d) t-l, .. ,ro 
Consumers are assumed to be infinitely lived. There is a 
total of N consumers and each one demands either 0 or 1 units 
of the good at every instant t. We denote consumers by their 
reservation values m; reservation values are distributed on 
some interval [0, M]. The cumulative distribution of consumers 
reservation values is F(m). We assume that F( ) is strictly 
increasing on the interval [O,M). The inverse function of 
F( ) id denoted by H( ). Hence H(F(m))=m. 
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Consumers will demand the duration d of smallest required 
expenditure. Thus, a consumer with a reservation value m 
will demand a duration d such that X(d)<=X(d') for every d', 
provided that X(d)<=m. If the smallest total expenditure X(d) 
is larger than the reservation value rn, then consumer m will 
choose not to buy. 
Suppose that d is the duration of smallest required 
expenditure. Then a total of: 
consumers will demand this duration; and the remaining 
consumers will choose not to buy. Since the good has to be 
replaced every d years, the (average) demand per year is 
simply: 
(6) 
The timing 
simplicity, 
of 
we 
Q(d)=[N-F«l-e-rd )-lp(d))]/d 
sales 
have 
is arbitrary in 
chosen to consider 
this 
that 
model. 
sales 
For 
are 
concentrated at dates 0, d, 2d, ... However our results do not 
depend on the particular demand pattern considered. 
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5.- OPTIMAL TAX POLICIES. 
We will be concerned with a particularly simple class of 
tax policies, which do not depend on the actual duration of 
the good. This seems to be a realistic requirement for a tax 
policy since there would be large costs 
administration of a duration-dependent 
invo 1 ved in the 
tax. Obtaining 
information on the average life of a product is a costly 
activity; furthermore, in many instances such information is 
only available ex post. 
It will be show that tax policies in the class considered 
are enough to induce the choice of an efficient duration. 
Thus, there is no loss of generality in disregarding 
duration-dependent tax policies. 
Specifically, a tax policy is defined as a pair of numbers 
(g,b) such that g is the per unit "ad valorem" tax, and b is 
the per unit "specific" tax. The particular case g=b=O refers 
to the case of no regulation. 
The total private cost of producing one unit of duration 
d, net of taxes, is: 
(7) 
Notice that the net cost is independent of the ad valorem 
tax. From this observation, and comparing the expressions for 
NC(d) and CC(d), the following results are obtained: 
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PROPOSITION 3: i) the value of d chosen by the firm is 
unaffected by t, i. e., an ad valorem tax is neutral wi th 
respect to the duration of the good and the amount of 
residuals produced. 
ii) If b=E, then the firm will choose to produce the optimal 
duration d*. 
PROOF: i) NC(d) does not depend on g. 
ii) Setting b=E, it follows that NC(d)=CC(d). Hence, both 
functions reach a minimum at d*.///. 
A full characterization of the optimal policy requires to 
specify the concrete structure of the market. We consider in 
this section the benchmark of a perfectly competitive market. 
Under perfect competition the equilibrium industry profits, 
defined by: 
(8) B(d,P(d) ,t,b)=(l-e-rd )-l«l-g)P(d)-b-C(d» (N-F(X(d»), 
are equal to zero. Unless the market is closed, so that 
N=F(X(d», the zero profit condition implies that: 
(9) (l-g)P(d)=b+C(d) 
Eff iciency in the choice of d requires to set b=E. 
Efficiency in the choice of an industry output level requires 
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price to be set equal to the (social) marginal cost 
(E+C(d*)). Hence we have the following: 
PROPOSITION 4: Under perfect competition the optimal tax 
policy is g=O and b=E. 
According to Proposition 4, efficient durations can be 
obtained by means of a linear tax policy. Our intuition 
regarding the neutrality (and ineffectiveness) of "ad 
valorem" taxation is confirmed; a pigouvian tax, charging the 
average external cost, is all that is needed to restore 
efficient residual levels. 
The neutrality of an ad valorem tax suggests that the 
optimal policy in an imperfectly competitive market will 
retain, in essence, the simple structure of the policy of 
Proposition 4. This is illustrated for the case of a 
monopoly. 
The profits of the monopolist are identical to industry 
profits under perfect competition. It will be assumed that 
the profit function is concave, so that the behavior of the 
monopolist can be characterized by means of first order 
conditions. Optimal policies are then as follows: 
PROPOSITION 5: The efficient tax policy for a monopoly is: 
(10) b=E 
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(11) 
where 
PROOF: b=E follows from proposition 3. The choice of price 
must satisfy the necessary condition for a maximum: 
( 1-g) (1- e - rd) -1 (N - F ( X ( d) ) ) - ( 1- e - r d) - 2 [ ( 1-g) P ( d) - b-
C(d) ]f(X(d) )=0 
output levels are efficient if price equals marginal cost, 
i.e., P(d*)=E+C(d*). substituting this last condition in the 
first order condition given above, and solving for g, the 
result follows immediately. Ill. 
Notice that the optimal value of g, characterized in the 
proposition will generally be negative, i.e., an ad valorem 
subsidy may be optimal. 
In summary, an ad valorem tax affects prices and quantities 
but is neutral with respect to duration. Thus, an specific 
tax can be used to induce the choice of an efficient 
duration, and then an ad valorem tax or subsidy can be used 
to affect the price. The analysis of a value added tax would 
yield similar results. 
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6.- CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
To keep the arguments straight, it has been assumed 
throughout this paper that duration is the only relevant 
variable in determining environmental costs; likewise, only 
one instrument of public policy -taxation- has been 
considered. In this simplified context, the lack of 
effectivity of most common forms of taxation in controlling 
residuals pollution can be more easily highlighted. 
In practice, the regulatory problem is a bit more complex. 
The quality of the residuals generated is as important as the 
quantity. Recycling costs, for instance, are highly sensitive 
to the composition of the residuals. Likewise, the amount of 
pollution generated depends on the chemical properties of the 
residuals. The quality of residuals poses similar problems to 
those related to the quantity of residuals. Through the 
choice of a technology, firms indirectly choose the quality 
of the residuals. Environmental costs are, once again, mostly 
external to the firm. Hence, a tendency towards an 
inefficiently low quality may be expected. 
Tax policies are relatively ineffective in motivating the 
adoption of technologies that generate less costly residuals. 
This is so because criteria of measurement of the quality of 
the residuals have to be developed for each product and/or 
. product component. Under these circumstances, direct 
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regulation, in the form of imposed quality standards, may be 
more effective. 
On the other hand, direct regulation does not seem 
appropriate in motivating extended product durability because 
the expected life of a product is not ex ante observable. 
Thus, it seems that an efficient policy must adopt a 
combination of fiscal and direct instruments. Among the 
first, there are some options not considered in this paper. 
Of particular interest are discounts and subsidies offered to 
stimulate the recycling of residuals. 
A problem related to the one considered in this paper is 
the lack of incentives for the firms to invest in research on 
new -less polluting- technologies. Technological 
opportunities are taken as given in our model. The 
environmental benefits of a new technology are external to 
the users of the technology. Thus, if technologies have to be 
developed, too little investment in R&D can be expected in 
the absence of regulation. An optimal tax policy, in this 
case, must take into account the changing value of the 
environmental costs. 
A final extension of the basic model could consider 
environmental costs in a general equilibrium framework. The 
basic insight to be obtained by considering the whole economy 
is that, as some goods are overproduced, others will be 
underproduced. The overproduction of some durable goods 
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implies that less resources will be devoted to the production 
of non-durable and non-polluting dUrable. If, for instance, 
cars production decreases, demand and resources may shift to 
public transportation. 
In consequence, a regulatory policy can be expected to 
have a primary and a secondary effect. The primary effect is 
to reduce production in the regulated market. The secondary 
effect is to increase production in other related markets. 
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